webhooks

Webhook signature verification (timing-safe compare)

For webhooks, I assume the internet is hostile by default. I don’t trust that a request ‘looks like’ it came from Stripe/GitHub/etc; I verify the signature over the raw request body and use crypto.timingSafeEqual to avoid leaking information via timin

Webhook signature verification

When receiving webhooks from external services, signature verification ensures the payload comes from the claimed sender and hasn't been tampered with. Services like Stripe and GitHub include an HMAC signature in headers computed from the request body

Robust Webhook Verification (HMAC + Timestamp)

Webhooks are a security boundary. Verify signatures with constant-time compare, include a timestamp window to prevent replay, and store processed event IDs to make handlers idempotent.

Webhook signature verification with HMAC (timing-safe compare)

Webhook endpoints should assume the internet is hostile. I verify the request with an HMAC signature derived from the raw body and a shared secret, and I use hmac.Equal to avoid timing leaks. The key detail is reading the body exactly once: the server